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Abstract
This work studies formal utility and privacy guarantees for a simple multiplicative database
transformation, where the data are compressed by a random linear or affine transformation,
reducing the number of data records substantially, while preserving the number of original
input variables. We provide an analysis framework inspired by a recent concept known as
differential privacy [7]. Our goal is to show that, despite the general difficulty of achieving
the differential privacy guarantee, it is possible to publish synthetic data that are useful for a
number of common statistical learning applications. This includes high dimensional sparse
regression [23], principal component analysis (PCA), and other statistical measures [15] based
on the covariance of the initial data.
1 Introduction
In statistical learning, privacy is increasingly a concern whenever large amounts of confidential data are
manipulated within or published outside an organization. It is often important to allow researchers to analyze
data utility without leaking information or compromising the privacy of individual records. In this work,
we demonstrate that one can preserve utility for a variety of statistical applications while achieving a formal
definition of privacy. The algorithm we study is a simple random projection by a matrix of independent
Gaussian random variables that compresses the number of records in the database. Our goal is to preserve
the privacy of every individual in the database, even if the number of records in the database is very large. In
1
particular, we show how this randomized procedure can achieve a form of “differential privacy” [7], while at
the same time showing that the compressed data can be used for Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and
other operations that rely on the accuracy of the empirical covariance matrix computed via the compressed
data, compared to its population or the uncompressed correspondents. Toward this goal, we also study
“distributional privacy” which is more natural for many statistical inference tasks.
More specifically, the data are represented as a n × p matrix X . Each of the p columns is an attribute,
and each of the n rows is the vector of attributes for an individual record. The data are compressed by a
random linear transformation X 7→ X ≡ 8X , where 8 is a random m × n matrix with m ≪ n. It is also
natural to consider a random affine transformation X 7→ X ≡ 8X+1, where 1 is a random m× p matrix,
as considered in [23] for privacy analysis, the latter of which is beyond the scope of this paper and intended
as future work. Such transformations have been called “matrix masking” in the privacy literature [6]. The
entries of 8 are taken to be independent Gaussian random variables, but other distributions are possible.
The resulting compressed data can then be made available for statistical analyses; that is, we think of X as
“public,” while 8 and 1 are private and only needed at the time of compression. However, even if 8 were
revealed, recovering X from X requires solving a highly underdetermined linear system and comes with
information theoretic privacy guarantees, as demonstrated in [23].
Informally, differential privacy [7] limits the increase in the information that can be learned when any
single entry is changed in the database. This limit implies [16] that allowing one’s data to be included in
the database is in some sense incentive-compatible. Differential privacy imposes a compelling and clear
requirement, that when running a privacy-preserving algorithm on two neighboring databases that differ in
only one entry, the probability of any possible outcome of the algorithm should be nearly (multiplicatively)
equal. Many existing results in differential privacy use additive output perturbations by adding a small
amount of random noise to the released information according to the sensitivity of the query function f on
data X . In this work, we focus on a class F of Lipschitz functions that are bounded, up to a constant L , by
the differences between two covariance matrices, (for example, for 6 = X T X
n
and its compressed realization
6′ = X T 8T8X
m
given 8),
F(L) =
{
f : | f (A)− f (D)| ≤ L ‖A − D‖
}
, (1)
where A, D are positive definite matrices and ‖·‖ is understood to be any matrix norm (for example, PCA
depends on ‖6 − 6′‖F ). Hence we focus on releasing a multiplicative form of perturbation of the input
data, such that for a particular type of functions as in (1), we achieve both utility and privacy. Due to the
space limits, we only explore PCA in this paper.
We emphasize that although one could potentially release a version of the covariance matrix to preserve
data privacy while performing PCA and functions as in (1), releasing the compressed data 8X is more
informative than releasing the perturbed covariance matrix (or other summaries) alone. For example, Zhou et
al. [23] demonstrated the utility of this random linear transformation by analyzing the asymptotic properties
of a statistical estimator under random projection in the high dimensional setting for n ≪ p. They showed
that the relevant linear predictors can be learned from the compressed data almost as well as they could be
from the original uncompressed data. Moreover, the actual predictions based on new examples are almost
as accurate as they would be had the original data been made available. Finally, it is possible to release the
compressed data plus some other features of the data to yield more information, although this is beyond the
scope of the current paper. We note that in order to guarantee differential privacy, p < n is required.
In the context of guarding privacy over a set of databases Sn = {X1, X2, . . .}, where6 j = X Tj X j/n,∀X j .
we introduce an additional parameter in our privacy definition, 1max(Sn), which is an upper bound on pair-
wise distances between any two databases X1, X2 ∈ Sn (differing in any number of rows), according to a
certain distance measure. In some sense, this parametrized approach of tuning the magnitude of the distance
measure 1max(Sn) is the key idea we elaborate in Section 3.
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Toward these goals, we develop key ideas in Section 4, that include measure space truncation and renor-
malization for each measure P6 j ,∀ j with Law L
(·|X j) ∼ N(0, 6 j ); these ideas are essential in order to
guarantee differential privacy, which requires that even for very rare events,
∣∣ln P6i (E)/P6 j (E)∣∣ remains
small ∀i, j . We show that such rare events, when they happen not to be useful for the utilities that we ex-
plore, can be cut out entirely from the output space by simply discarding such outputs and regenerating a
new X . In this way, we provide a differential privacy guarantee by avoiding the comparisons made on these
rare events. We conjecture that this is a common phenomenon rather than being specific to our analysis
alone. In some sense, this observation is the inspiration for our distributional privacy definition: over a large
number n of elements drawn from D, the entire ocean of elements, the tail events are even more rare by
the Law of Large Numbers, and hence we can safely truncate events whose measure P [E] decreases as n
increases.
Related work is summarized in Section 1.1. Section 2 formalizes privacy definitions. Section 3 gives
more detail of our probability model and summarizes our results on privacy and PCA (with proof in Sec-
tion 5). All technical proofs appear in the Appendix.
1.1 Related Work
Research on privacy in statistical data analysis has a long history, going back at least to [4]. We refer to [6] for
discussion and further pointers into this literature; recent work includes [20]. Recent approaches to privacy
include data swapping [13], k-anonymity [21], and cryptographic approaches (for instance, [18, 12]). Much
of the work on data perturbation for privacy (for example, [11, 14, 22]) focuses on additive or multiplicative
perturbation of individual records, which may not preserve similarities or other relationships within the
database. Prior to [23], in [1], an information-theoretic quantification of privacy was proposed.
A body of recent work (for example, [5, 10, 7, 9, 17, 16]) explores the tradeoffs between privacy and
utility while developing the definitions and theory of differential privacy. The two main techniques used to
achieve differential privacy to date have been additive perturbation of individual database queries by Laplace
noise and the “exponential mechanism” [16]. In contrast, we provide a polynomial time non-interactive
algorithm for guaranteeing differential privacy. Our goal is to show that, despite the general difficulty of
achieving the differential privacy guarantee, it is possible to do so with an efficient algorithm for a specific
class of functions.
The work of [15] and [23], like the work presented here, both consider low rank random linear trans-
formations of the data X , and discuss privacy and utility. Liu et al. [15] argue heuristically that random
projection should preserve utility for data mining procedures that exploit correlations or pairwise distances
in the data. Their privacy analysis is restricted to observing that recovering X from 8X requires solving an
under-determined linear system. Zhou et al. [23] provide information-theoretic privacy guarantees, showing
that the information rate I (X ;X )
np → 0 as n →∞. Their work casts privacy in terms of the rate of information
communicated about X through X , maximizing over all distributions on X . Hence their analysis provides
privacy guarantees in an average sense, whereas in this work we prove differential privacy-style guarantees
that aim to apply to every participant in the database semantically.
2 Definitions and preliminaries
For a database D, let A be a database access mechanism. We present non-interactive database privacy
mechanisms, meaning that A(D) induces a distribution over sanitized output databases D′. We first recall
the standard differential privacy definition from Dwork [7].
Definition 2.1. (α-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY) [7] A randomized function A gives α-differential privacy if
for all data sets D1 and D2 differing on at most one element, and all S ⊆ Range(A), P [A(D1) ∈ S] ≤
3
eαP [A(D2) ∈ S] .
We now formalize our notation.
Notation: Let D be a collection of all records (potentially coming from some underlying distribution) and
σ (D) represent the entire set of input databases with elements drawn from D. Let Sn = {X1, X2, . . .} ⊂
σ (D), where X i ∈ σ (D),∀i , denote a set of databases, each with n elements drawn from D. Although
differential privacy is defined with respect to all D, E ∈ σ (D), we constrain the definition of distributional
privacy to the scope of Sn , which becomes clear in Definition 2.4. We let D′ be the entire set of possible
output databases.
Definition 2.2. A privacy algorithm A takes an input database D ∈ σ (D) and outputs a probability measure
PD on D′, where D′ is allowed to be different from σ (D). Let P denote all probability measures on D′.
Then a privacy algorithm is a map A : σ (D)→ P where A(D) = PD,∀D ∈ σ (D).
We now define differential privacy for continuous output. We introduce an additional parameter δ which
measures how different two databases are according to V below.
Definition 2.3. Let V (D, E) be the distance between D and E according to a certain metric, which is
related to the utility we aim to provide. Let d(D, E) denote the number of rows in which D and E differ.
δ-constrained α-Differential ((α, δ)-Differential Privacy) requires the following condition,
sup
D,E :d(D,E)=1,V(D,E)≤δ
1(PD, PE ) ≤ eα, (2)
where 1(P, Q) = ess supD∈D′ d Pd Q (D) denotes the essential supremum over D′ for the Radon-Nikodym
derivative d P/d Q.
Let Sn = {X1, X2, . . .} be a set of databases of n records. Let 1max(Sn) bound the pairwise distance
between X i , X j ∈ Sn,∀i, j . We now introduce a notion of distributional privacy, that is similar in spirit to
that in [3].
Definition 2.4. (DISTRIBUTIONAL PRIVACY FOR CONTINUOUS OUTCOME) An algorithm A satisfies
(α, δ)-distributional privacy on Sn , for which a global parameter 1max(Sn) is specified, if for any two
databases X1, X2 ∈ Sn such that each consists of n elements drawn from D, where X1 ∩ X2 may not
be empty, and for all sanitized outputs X ∈ D′,
fX1(X ) ≤ eα fX2(X ), ∀X1, X2 s.t. V (X1, X2) ≤ δ (3)
where fX j (·) is the density function for the conditional distribution with law L
(·|X j) ,∀i given X j .
Note that this composes nicely if one is considering databases that differ in multiple rows. In particular,
randomness in X j is not directly exploited in the definition as we treat elements in X j ∈ σ (D) as fixed data.
One could assume that they come from an underlying distribution, e.g., a multivariate Gaussian N(0, 6∗),
and infer the distance between 6i and its population correspondent 6∗. We now show that distributional
privacy is a stronger concept than differential privacy.
Theorem 2.5. Given Sn, if A satisfies (α, δ)-distributional privacy as in Definition 2.4 for all X j ∈ Sn , then
A satisfies (α, δ)-Differential Privacy as in Definition 2.3 for all X j ∈ S .
Proof. For the same constraint parameter δ, if we guarantee that (3) is satisfied, for all X i , X j ∈ Sn that
differ only in a single row such that V (X i , X j ) ≤ δ, we have shown the α-differential privacy on Sn; clearly,
this type of guarantee is necessary in order to guarantee α-distributional privacy over all X i , X j ∈ Sn that
satisfy the δ constraint. 
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3 Probability model and summary of results
Let (X i) represent the matrix corresponding to X i ∈ Sn. By default, we use (X i ) j ∈ Rp,∀ j = 1, . . . , n,
and (X Ti ) j ∈ Rn,∀ j = 1, . . . p to denote row vectors and column vectors of matrix (X i) respectively.
Throughout this paper, we assume that given any X i ∈ Sn, columns are normalized,∥∥(X Ti ) j∥∥22 = n,∀ j = 1, . . . , p,∀X i ∈ Sn (4)
which can be taken as the first step of our sanitization scheme. Given X j , 8m×n induces a distribution
over all m × p matrices in Rm×p via X = 8X j , where 8i j ∼ N(0, 1/n),∀i, j . Let L(·|X j ) denote the
conditional distribution given X j and P6 j denote its probability measure, where 6 j = X Tj X j/n,∀X j ∈ Sn.
Hence X = (x1, . . . , xm)T is a Gaussian Ensemble composed of m i.i.d. random vectors with L
(
xi |X j
) ∼
N(0, 6 j ),∀i = 1, . . . ,m.
Given a set of databases Sn = {X1, X2, . . .}, we do assume there is a true parameter 6∗ such that
61, 62, . . ., where 6 j = X Tj X j/n, are just a sequence of empirical parameters computed from databases
X1, X2 . . . ∈ Sn . Define
1max(Sn) := 2 sup
X j∈Sn
max
ℓ,k
∣∣6 j (ℓ, k)−6∗(ℓ, k)∣∣ . (5)
Although we do not suppose we know 6∗, we do compute 6i ,∀i . Thus 1max(Sn) provides an upper bound
on the perturbations between any two databases X i , X j ∈ Sn:
max
ℓ,k
∣∣6i(ℓ, k)−6 j (ℓ, k)∣∣ ≤ 1max(Sn). (6)
We now relate two other parameters that measure pairwise distances between elements in Sn to 1max(Sn).
For a symmetric matrix M , λmin(M), λmax(M) = ‖M‖2 are the smallest and largest eigenvalues respectively
and the Frobenius norm is given by ‖M‖F =
√∑
i
∑
j M2i j .
Proposition 3.1. Subject to normalization as in (4), w.l.o.g., for any two databases X1, X j , let 1 = 61−6 j
and Ŵ = 6−1j − 6−11 = 6−1j (61 − 6 j )6−11 = 6−1j 16−11 . Suppose maxℓ,k
∣∣(61 −6 j )ℓk∣∣ ≤ 1max(Sn),∀ j
then
‖1‖F ≤ p1max(Sn) and (7)
‖Ŵ‖F ≤ ‖1‖F
λmin(61)λmin(6 j )
. (8)
Suppose we choose a reference point 61 which can be thought of as an approximation to the true value
6∗.
Assumption 1: Let λmin(6−11 ) = 1λmax(61) ≥ Cmin for some constant Cmin > 0. Suppose ‖Ŵ‖2 = o(1) and‖1‖2 = o(1).
Assumption 1 is crucial in the sense that it guarantees that all matrices in Sn stay away from being
singular (see Lemma 3.3). We are now ready to state the first main result. Proof of the theorem appears in
Section A.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Assuming that ‖61‖2 , λmin(61) and λmin(6i ),∀X i ∈ Sn are
all in the same order, and m ≥ (ln 2np). Consider the worst case realization when ‖1‖F = 2(p1max(Sn)),
where 1max < 1.
In order to guard (distributional) privacy for all X i ∈ Sn in the sense of Definition 2.4, it is sufficient if
1max(Sn) = o
(
1/(p2
√
m ln 2np)
)
. (9)
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The following lemma is a standard result on existence conditions for 6−1j given 6
−1
1 . It also shows that
all eigenvalue conditions in Theorem 3.2 indeed hold given Assumption 1.
Lemma 3.3. Let λmin(61) > 0. Let 1 = 61 − 6 j and ‖1‖2 < λmin(61). Then λmin(6 j ) ≥ λmin(61) −
‖1‖2 .
Next we use the result by Zwald and Blanchard for PCA as an instance from (1) to illustrate the tradeoff
between parameters. Proof of Theorem 3.5 appears in Section 5.
Proposition 3.4. ([25]) Let A be a symmetric positive Hilbert-Schmidt operator of Hilbert space H with
simple nonzero eigenvalues λ1 > λ2 > . . .. Let D > 0 be an integer such that λD > 0 and δD =
1
2(λD − λD+1). Let B ∈ H S(H) be another symmetric operator such that ‖B‖F ≤ δD/2 and A+ B is still a
positive operator. Let P D(A) (resp. P D(A+ B)) denote the orthogonal projector onto the subspace spanned
by the first D eigenvectors A (resp. (A + B)). Then these satisfy
‖P D(A)− P D(A + B)‖F ≤ ‖B‖F/δD. (10)
Subject to measure truncation of at most 1/n2 in each P6 j ,∀X ∈ Sn, as we show in Section 4, we have,
Theorem 3.5. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. If we allow 1max(Sn) = O(
√
log p/n), then we essentially
perform PCA on the compressed sample covariance matrix X TX /m effectively in the sense of Propo-
sition 3.4: that is, in the form of (10) with A = X T X
n
and B = X T X
n
− A, where ‖B‖F = o(1) for
m = (p2 ln 2np). On the other hand, the databases in Sn are private in the sense of Definition 2.4, so long
as p2 = O (√n/m/log n). Hence in the worst case, we require
p = o
(
n1/6/
√
ln 2np
)
.
As a special case, we look at the following example.
Example 3.6. Let X1 = {Ex1, . . . , Exn}T be a matrix of {−1, 1}n×p . A neighboring matrix X2 is any matrix
obtained via changing the signs on τp bits, where 0 ≤ τ < 1, on any Exi .
Corollary 3.7. For the Example 3.6, it suffices if p = o(n/log n)1/4, in order to conduct PCA on com-
pressed data, (subject to measure truncation of at most 1/n2 in each P6 j ,∀X ∈ Sn,) effectively in the sense
of Proposition 3.4, while preserve the α-differential privacy for α = o(1).
4 Distributional privacy with bounded 1max(Sn)
In this section, we show how we can modify the output events X to effectively hide some large-tail events.
We make it clear how these tail events are connected to a particular type of utility. Given X i , let X = 8X i =
(x1, . . . , xm)
T
. Let f6i (x j ) = exp
{
− 12 xTj 6−1i x j
}
/|6i |1/2(2π)p/2 be the density for Gaussian distribution
N(0, 6i ). Before modification, the density function f6i (X ) is
f6i (X ) =
m∏
j=1
f6i (x j ). (11)
We focus on defining two procedures that lead to both distributional and differential types of privacy. Indeed,
the proof of Theorem 4.6 applies to both, as the distance metric V (X1, X2) does not specify how many rows
X1 and X2 differ in. We use 1max as a shorthand for 1max(Sn) when it is clear.
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Procedure 4.1. (TRUNCATION OF THE TAIL FOR RANDOM VECTORS IN Rp ) We require 8 to be an
independent random draw each time we generate a X for compression (or when we apply it to the same
dataset for handling a truncation event). W.l.o.g, we choose 61 to be a reference point. Now we only
examine output databases X ∈ Rm×p such that for C = √2(C1 + C2), where C1 ≈ 2.5 and C2 ≈ 7.7,
max
j,k
∣∣(X TX /m) j k −61( j, k)∣∣ ≤ C√ln 2np/m +1max, (12)
where 1max(Sn) = O
(√
log n/n
)
. Algorithmically, one can imagine that for an input X , each time we see
an output X = 8X that does not satisfy our need in the sense of (12), we throw the output database X away,
and generate a new random draw 8′ to calculate 8′X and repeat until 8′X indeed satisfies (12). We also
note that the adversary neither sees the databases we throw away nor finds out that we did so.
Given X i ∈ Sn, let P6i be the probability measure over random outcomes of 8X i . Upon truncation,
Procedure 4.2. (RENORMALIZATION) We set f ′6i (X ) = 0 for all X ∈ Rm×p belonging to set E , where
E = {
X : max
j,k
∣∣∣∣∣
(
X TX
m
)
j k
−61( j, k)
∣∣∣∣∣ > C
√
ln 2np
m
+1max
}
, (13)
corresponds to the bad events that we truncate from the outcome in Procedure 4.1; We then renormalize the
density as in (11) on the remaining X that satisfies (12) to obtain:
f ′6i (X ) =
f6i (X )
1− P6i [E]
. (14)
Remark 4.3. Hence
f ′61 (X )
f ′62 (X )
= f61 (X )(1−P62[E])f62 (X )(1−P61[E]) , which changes α(m, δ) that we bounded below based on
original density prior to truncation of E by a constant in the order of ln(1+ǫ) = O(ǫ), where ǫ = O(1/n2).
Hence we safely ignore this normalization issue given it only changes α(m, δ) by O(1/n2).
The following lemma bounds the probability on the events that we truncate in Procedure 4.1. Proof of
Lemma ?? appears in Section B.
Lemma 4.4. According to any individual probability measure P6i which corresponds to the sample space
for outcomes of8X i , suppose that the columns of (X i ) have been normalized to have
∥∥(X Ti ) j∥∥22 = n,∀i, j =
1, . . . , p and m ≥ 2(C1 + C2) ln 2np, then for E as defined in (13), P6i [E] ≤ 1n2 .
As hinted after Definition 2.4 regarding distributional privacy, we can think of the input data as coming
from a distribution, such that 1max(Sn) in (5) can be derived with a typical large deviation bound between
the sample and population covariances. For example, for multivariate Gaussian,
Lemma 4.5. ([19]) Suppose (X i ) j ∼ N(0, 6∗),∀ j = 1, . . . , n for all X i ∈ Sn , then 1max(Sn) =
OP
(√
log p/n
)
.
We now state the main result of this section. Proof of Theorem 4.6 appears in Section C.
Theorem 4.6. Under Assumption 1, let m and
∥∥(X Ti ) j∥∥2 ,∀i, j satisfy conditions in Lemma 4.4. By
truncating a subset of measure at most 1/n2 from each P6i , in the sense of Procedure 4.1 and renormalizing
the density functions according to Procedure 4.2, we have
α(m, δ) ≤ mp‖1‖F
2λmin(6i)λmin(61)
· (15)(
C
√
ln 2np
m
+1max + 2‖1‖F ‖61‖
2
2
pλmin(6i )λmin(61)
)
+ o(1)
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when comparing all X i ∈ Sn with X1, where ‖Ŵ‖F is bounded as as in (7) for i = 2.
Remark 4.7. While the theorem only states results for comparing f61 (X )f6i (X ) , we note ∀Xk, X j ∈ Sn ,∣∣∣∣∣ln f6k (·)f6 j (·)
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ln f6k (·)f61(·) ·
f61(·)
f6 j (·)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣ln f61(·)f6k (·)
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ln f61(·)f6 j (·)
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
which is simply a sum of terms as bounded as in (15).
5 Proof of Theorem 3.5
Combining the following theorem, which illustrates the tradeoff between the parameters n, p and m for
PCA, with Theorem 3.2, we obtain Theorem 3.5.
Theorem 5.1. For a database X ∈ Sn, let A, A + B be the original and compressed sample covariance
matrices respectively: A = X T X
n
and B = X TX
m
− X T X
n
, where X is generated via Procedure 4.1. By
requiring that m = (p2 ln 2np), we can achieve meaningful bounds in the form of (10).
Proof. We know that A and A + B are both positive definite, and B is symmetric. We first obtain a bound
on ‖B‖F =
√∑p
i=1
∑p
j=1 B
2
i j ≤ pτ, where
τ := max
j k
B j k = maxj k
∣∣(X TX /m) j k − A j k∣∣
≤ max
j k
∣∣(X TX /m) j k −61( j, k)∣∣+ ∣∣61( j, k)− A j k ∣∣
≤ C
√
ln 2np/m + 21max(Sn),
by (12), (6), and the triangle inequality, for X = 8X . The theorem follows by Proposition 3.4 given that
‖B‖F = o(1) for m = (p2 ln 2np). 
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A Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof of Theorem 3.2. First we plug ‖1‖F = p1max in (15), and we require each term in (15) to be o(1);
hence we require that p1max = o(1) and
p21max
√
m ln 2np = o(1) and mp212max = o(1), (16)
which are all satisfied given (9). Note that (16) implies that ‖1‖2 = ‖1‖F = p1max = o(1); hence
conditions in Assumption 1 are satisfied. 
B Proof of Lemma 4.4
Let us first state the following lemma.
Lemma B.1. (See [23] for example) Let x, y ∈ Rn with ‖x‖2 , ‖y‖2 ≤ 1. Assume that 8 is an m × n
random matrix with independent N(0, 1/n) entries (independent of x, y). Then for all τ > 0
P
[∣∣∣ n
m
〈8x,8y〉 − 〈x, y〉
∣∣∣ ≥ τ] ≤ 2 exp( −mτ 2C1 + C2τ
)
(17)
with C1 = 4e√6π ≈ 2.5044 and C2 =
√
8e ≈ 7.6885.
Proof of Lemma 4.4. Let X i, j ∈ Rn denote the j th,∀ j = 1, . . . , p, column in a n× p matrix ∀X i ∈ Sn,
W.l.o.g., we focus on P6i for i = 1, 2. We first note that by the triangle inequality, for X1, X2 ∈ Sn ,
for X = 8X1,
∣∣∣∣∣
(
X TX
m
)
j k
−61( j, k)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ 1m 〈(8X1) j , (8X1)k〉 − 1n 〈X1 j , X1k〉
∣∣∣∣
for X = 8X2,
∣∣∣∣∣
(
X TX
m
)
j k
−61( j, k)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ 1m 〈(8X2) j , (8X2)k〉 − 1n 〈X2 j , X2k〉
∣∣∣∣+ maxj,k ∣∣1 j k∣∣ ,
where max j,k
∣∣1 j k∣∣ ≤ 1max(Sn) by definition.
For each P6i , we let E represents union of the following events, where τ = 2(C1+C2) ln 2npm , ∃ j, k ∈
[1, . . . , p], s.t. ∣∣∣∣ 1m 〈(8X i) j , (8X i)k〉 − 1n 〈(X i ) j , (X i )k〉
∣∣∣∣ ≥ τ.
It is obvious that if Ec holds, we immediately have the inequality holds in the lemma for all P6i . Thus we
only need to show that
sup
X i∈D
P6i [E] ≤ 1/n2, where 6i =
X Ti X i
n
. (18)
We first bound the probability of a single event counted in E , which is invariant across all P6i and we
thus do not differentiate. Consider two column vectors x = X i√
n
, y = X j√
n
∈ Rn in matrix X√
n
, we have
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‖x‖2 = 1, ‖y‖2 = 1. Hence for τ ≤ 1, by Lemma B.1,
P
[∣∣∣∣ 1m 〈8X i ,8X j 〉 − 1n 〈X i , X j 〉
∣∣∣∣ ≥ τ
]
= P
[∣∣∣ n
m
〈8x,8y〉 − 〈x, y〉
∣∣∣ ≥ τ]
≤ 2 exp
( −mτ 2
C1 + C2τ
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− mτ
2
C1 + C2
)
.
We can now bound the probability that any such large-deviation event happens. Recall that p is the to-
tal number of columns of X , hence the total number of events in E is p(p+1)2 . Now by taking τ =√
2(C1+C2) ln 2np
m
< 1, where m ≥ 2(C1 + C2) ln 2np, we have for all 6i ,
P6i [E] ≤
p(p + 1)
2
P6i
[∣∣∣∣ 1m 〈8X i ,8X j 〉 − 1n 〈X i , X j 〉
∣∣∣∣ ≥ τ
]
≤ p(p + 1) exp
(
− mτ
2
C1 + C2
)
<
1
n2
This implies (18) and hence the lemma holds. 
C Proof of Theorem 4.6
W.l.o.g., we compare 62 and 61. We first focus on bound ln |62| − ln |61|. The following proposition
comes from existing result.
Proposition C.1. ([24]) Suppose ‖Ŵ‖2 = o(1) and ‖1‖2 = o(1). Then for 2i = 6−1i ,
ln |62| − ln |61| = ln |21| − ln |22| = A − tr(Ŵ61),
where
A = vecŴT ·
(∫ 1
0
(1 − v)(21 + vŴ)−1 ⊗ (21 + vŴ)−1dv
)
· vecŴ.
The lower bound on A in Lemma C.2 comes from existing result [24]. We include the proof here for
showing that the spectrum of integral term in A is lower and upper bounded by that of 61 squared, up to
some small multiplicative constants.
Lemma C.2. ([24]) Let 21 = 6−11 and 22 = 6−12 , and hence 22 = 21 + Ŵ. Under Assumption 1,
‖61‖2 ‖Ŵ‖2 ≤
‖1‖2 ‖61‖2
λmin(62)λmin(61)
= o(1),
Then
‖Ŵ‖2Fλmin(61)2
2 (1+ λmin(61) ‖Ŵ‖2)2
≤ A ≤ ‖Ŵ‖
2
F ‖61‖22
2− o(1) .
We are now ready to prove the theorem.
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Proof of Theorem 4.6. Let us consider the product measure that is defined by (8i j ). The ratio of the
two original density functions (prior to normalization) for X = (x1, . . . , xm)T ∈ Rm×p is:
f61(X )
f62(X )
=
∏m
i=1 f61(xi )∏m
i=1 f62(xi )
=
|62|m/2
|61|m/2 exp
{
m∑
i=1
−1
2
xTi
(
6−11 −6−12
)
xi
}
= exp
{
m
2
ln |62| − m2 ln |61| +
m
2
tr
(
Ŵ
(
m∑
i=1
xi x
T
i
m
))}
Hence by Proposition C.1 and Lemma C.2, we have that
α(m, δ) ≤
∣∣∣∣m2 ln |62| − m2 ln |61| + m2 tr
(
Ŵ
(
X TX
m
))∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣m A2 − m2 tr(Ŵ61)+ m2 tr
(
Ŵ
(
X TX
m
))∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣m A2
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣m2 tr
(
Ŵ
(
X TX
m
−61
))∣∣∣∣ .
Hence for X that satisfies (12), ignoring renormalization, we have for X1, X2,
α(m, δ) ≤
m
2
‖vecŴ‖1 maxj,k
∣∣∣∣∣
(
X TX
m
)
j k
−61( jk)
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣m A2
∣∣∣∣
≤ mp‖Ŵ‖F
2
(
C
√
ln 2np
m
+1max
)
+ m‖Ŵ‖
2
F ‖61‖22
2(1 − o(1))
where
‖Ŵ‖F ≤
∥∥6−12 ∥∥2 ‖1‖F ∥∥6−11 ∥∥2 = ‖1‖Fλmin(62)λmin(61) .
The theorem holds given (14) in Procedure 4.2, Remark 4.3 and Lemma 4.4. 
We now show the proof for Lemma C.2. Proof of Proposition C.1 appears in [24].
Proof of Lemma C.2. After factoring out ‖vecŴ‖22 = ‖Ŵ‖2F , A becomes
λmin
(∫ 1
0
(1− v)(21 + vŴ)−1 ⊗ (21 + vŴ)−1dv
)
≥
∫ 1
0
(1 − v)λ2min(21 + vŴ)−1dv
≥ inf
v∈[0,1]
λ2min(21 + vŴ)−1
∫ 1
0
(1 − v)dv
≥ 1
2
inf
v∈[0,1]
λ2min(21 + vŴ)−1 =
1
2
inf
v∈[0,1]
1
‖21 + vŴ‖22
≥ inf
v∈[0,1]
1
2 (‖21‖2 + v ‖Ŵ‖2)2
≥ 1
2 (‖21‖2 + ‖Ŵ‖2)2
= λmin(61)
2
2 (1 + λmin(61) ‖Ŵ‖2)2
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where (19) is due to the fact that the set of p2 eigenvalues of B(v) ⊗ B(v), where B(v) = (21 + vŴ)−1,
∀v ∈ [0, 1], is {λi(B(v))λ j(B(v)),∀i, j = 1, . . . , p}, which are all positive given that (21 + vŴ) ≻ 0,
hence (21 + vŴ)−1 ≻ 0, ∀v ∈ [0, 1] as shown above. Similarly,
λmax
(∫ 1
0
(1− v)(21 + vŴ)−1 ⊗ (21 + vŴ)−1dv
)
≤
∫ 1
0
(1 − v)λ2max(21 + vŴ)−1dv
≤ sup
v∈[0,1]
λ2max(21 + vŴ)−1
∫ 1
0
(1− v)dv
≤ sup
v∈[0,1]
1
2λ2min(21 + vŴ)
,
where ∀v ∈ [0, 1],
λmin(21 + vŴ) ≥ λmin(21)− v ‖Ŵ‖2 =
1 − v ‖Ŵ‖2 ‖61‖2
‖61‖2
> 0
where so long as ‖1‖2 = o(1) and ‖61‖2 and λmin(61) are within constant order of each other, we have
‖61‖2 ‖Ŵ‖2 ≤
‖1‖2 ‖61‖2
λmin(62)λmin(61)
= o(1).
Hence ∀v ∈ [0, 1],
1
λmin(21 + vŴ) ≤
‖61‖2
1− v ‖61‖2 ‖Ŵ‖2
≤ ‖61‖2
1 − ‖61‖2 ‖Ŵ‖2
and correspondingly
sup
v∈[0,1]
1
2λ2min(21 + vŴ)
≤ ‖61‖
2
2
2 (1 − ‖61‖2 ‖Ŵ‖2)2
.

D Example with binary data matrix
We now show how we can achieve differential privacy in the setting where X1, X2 ∈ Rnp such that they
differ in a single row. We also define the some special case of this general setting. We further illustrate
the idea that one can not allow differential privacy without giving certain constraints on X1, X2, . . .. As a
corollary of Theorem 4.6, we consider the following example.
Proposition D.1. For the Binary Game in Example 3.6, we have for all τ ≤ 1 and x ∈ Rp,
‖1‖2 ≤ ‖1‖F ≤
2p
√
τ(1− τ)
n
≤ p
n
.
Proof. For the special case that X1 and X2 differ only in a single row after normalization, such that x ∈ X1
and y ∈ X2, we have 1 = 61 − 62 = x xT−yyTn . First note ‖1‖2 ≤ ‖1‖F . In order to bound ‖1‖F let us
define
B = xxT − yyT , C = (x − y)xT , D = y(x − y)T , (19)
where B = C + D are all p × p matrices. A careful counting of non-zero elements in C + D gives
‖1‖2 ≤ ‖1‖F = 2 pn
√
τ(1 − τ) ≤ p
n
for τ ≤ 1/2. Note that when τ > 1/2, the effect on ‖1‖F is the same
as flipping 1 − τ bits, hence it is maximized when τ = 1/2. 
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Theorem D.2. In the binary game in 3.6, by truncating a subset of measure at most 1/n2, we have
α(m, τ ) ≤
∣∣∣∣mp2(C
√
ln 2np/m + O(1/n))
nλmin(62)λmin(61)
∣∣∣∣ = o(1)
for p = o(√n/m) and m ≥ (ln 2np).
Proof. Note that for a binary game, 1max = max j k 1 j k ≤ 2n . As shown in Proposition D.1,
‖1‖F ≤ p
n
.
Plugging the above inequalities in (15), we have
α(m, τ ) ≤ mp
2
nλmin(62)λmin(61)
·(
C
√
ln 2np
m
+ 2
n
+ 2 ‖61‖
2
2
nλmin(62)λmin(61)
)
+ o(1)
where for p = o(√n/m) and for m ≥ (ln 2np), we have α(m, τ ) = o(1). 
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